Abstract-adi it ion ally, the problems of Byzantine agreement, concensus, and interactive consistency are studied in a fully connected network with processors in malicious failure only. Such problems are re-examined with the assumption of malicious faults on both processors and links. The proposed protocols use the minimum number of message exchanges and can tolerate the maximum number of allowable faulty components to make each fault-free processor reach a common agreement for the cases of processor failure, link failure, or processor and link failure.
I. INTRODUCTION
N many cases, a fault-free processor in a distributed system I should be able to reach a common agreement. To achieve such a goal is called an agreement problem [13] , of which protocols are required so that the system will run even if certain components in the system fail. With the agreement, some applications can be achieved, such as the two-phase commit in a distributed database system [15] , [19] , the whereabouts of a replicated file in a distributed environment [14] , [16] , [23] , and a landing task controlled by the processors in a flight control system [29] .
As for the form of the common agreement, a single value [l] , [3] , [6] , [13] , [17] , [28] or a set of values [12] , [21] are the two cases usually considered by previous research. One wellknown problem studied by Lamport is called the byzantine agreement (BA) [I] , [31, [61, [171, [IS] , [221, P I , [261, [281. In the BA problem, a single value to be agreed on is initialized by an arbitrary processor in a fully connected network with n processors, such that every processor can exchange a message directly with each other; hence, the possibility that a message is contaminated by other intermediary processors or links is avoided. When every processor has its own initial value and each fault-free processor agrees on a common single value, such a problem is called the consensus problem [2] , [lo], [13] . On the other hand, an interactive consistency problem [ 121, [21] requires that each fault-free processor should be able to agree on a set of common values. The three problems have a common feature: namely, that every faultfree processor should eventually reach a common agreement through a number of message exchanges. The major difference among the three problems is on the value to be agreed on.
On BA and consensus, the value to be agreed on is a single common value. On interactive consistency, the value to be agreed on is a set of common values.
However, the common value or the set of common values should be free from the influence of a faulty component in the network; otherwise the common value cannot be used to determine the agreement. As for the faulty component, Lamport [17] , [22] was the first to solve the BA problem with processor failures only. His protocol requires tp + 1 rounds', even if t,(< [(n -1)/3J) processors fail in a fully connected network. Moreover, he proved that the solution is impossible if the number of faulty processors exceeds t, [17] , [22] . Subsequently, Fischer et al. [12] pointed out that t, + 1 rounds are the minimum number of message exchanges required to have an agreement. These results only apply to a fully connected network with fallible processors connected by fault-free communication links [l] , [5] - [7] , [12] , [21] , [22] . This paper extends to the case that both processor and link could fail. The proposed protocol makes every fault-free processor reach a common agreement by using the minimum number of rounds, even if the number of faulty components is Ln/2] -1, of which L(n -1)/3] are faulty processors and the rest are faulty links. If the number of faulty components is beyond the Ln/2J -1, the fault-free processor could not reach a common agreement because the number of false messages will dominate the correct messages. Within the bound, each processor makes several synchronized message exchanges with the other processors, after which the fault-free processors shall agree on a common message. Using the agreed common message, the two-phase commit [15] , [19] or controlling a "landing progress" in a flight management system [29] can be achieved.
A. Problem Definition
To design an agreement protocol and compare the three problems in detail, the definitions of the three agreement problems should be investigated, respectively.
Traditionally, the BA problem defined by Lamport [17] , [22] assumes: 1) there are n processors, of which at most t, processors could fail; 2) the processors can directly communicate with one another through message exchange in a fully connected network; 3) the message sender is always identifiable by the receiver; 4) an arbitrary processor is chosen as a source and its initial value U, broadcasts to other processors and itself when the protocol starts to execute (this will be modified to The first assumption of the problem implies that the number of faulty processors cannot exceed t,; otherwise the faulty processors dominate the fault-free processors; hence, false messages dominate the correct messages, then an agreement cannot be reached. The purpose of the second assumption is to minimize the number of rounds required for receiving other processors' messages; otherwise, more than one round will be required to send a message to its destination. The third assumption ensures that the receiver knows the whereabouts of the received message, and then the received message with the sender's identification formed with a special purpose data structure is stored in the receiver's memory in order to reach an agreement. Such a data structure will be described later with the proposed protocol. With the assumption, if a processor fails to send a message as it should be, or if the received message is inappropriate (e (0, l}), a default value could be set by the receiver for the agreement.
As for the number of processors which could initialize the initial value, the BA takes one processor. For the consensus problem and the interactive consistency problem, each processor i has its own initial value w, before executing the protocols.
This assumption is different from the fourth assumption of the BA problem. However, if the initial value issued by one processor can be solved, the case of every processor with its own initial value can also be solved by using n copies of "oneprocessor protocol" running in parallel. So the case of only one processor being able to initialize the initial value (so-called the BA problem) is studied first. The fifth assumption of the BA problem limits the faulty component to one processor only. In a practical situation, both processors and links may fail. This fifth assumption will be relaxed in Section I-B.
In the "consensus problem," each processor broadcasts its initial value to others and itself in the first round, and the protocols developed for reaching a consensus have the (GCI): every fault-free processor computes a common value ' U which is used to determine the agreement; (GC2): if the initial value of each fault-free processor is U,, then the common value w to be agreed on should be the initial value wz.
value w which is used to determine the agreement; ' U should be the initial value w, of the source. (GI2): if the ith processor is fault-free and its initial value is vz, then the ith value w, to be agreed on in the common vector V should be w,. Note that the ith value U, in the common vector V corresponds to the ith processor for 1 5 i 5 n. To summarize, Table I compares the assumptions and goals of three agreement problems.
The general features of the three problems are: 1) every fault-free processor shall reach an agreement; and 2) messages are directly exchanged among processors in order to reach a common agreement.
From the viewpoint of the definition of the initial value, we may say that the BA problem is a special case of the interactive consistency problem in which only one processor's initial value is of interest, so a protocol for reaching an interactive consistency can also solve the BA problem. Conversely, if n copies of the BA protocol are run in parallel, the interactive consistency problem is solved. When the interactive consistency problem is solved, the consensus problem is also solved by making each fault-free processor agree on the majority of the common vector which is computed by the interactive consistency protocol. Therefore, the BA problem is studied first in this paper, and then the concept of n copies of the BA protocol running in parallel to solve the interactive consistency problem. Finally, the consensus problem is solved by making each processor choose the major value of the common vector as the common agreed value.
In short, to solve a BA problem is to make every fault-free processor agree on a common value regardless of the influence of faulty components. The difficulty of reaching an agreement is how to remove the influence of faulty components during the execution of a protocol so that the agreement value is free from the influence of a faulty component; hence, the failure types of a faulty component should be examined first.
Based on the same assumptions, each processor broadcasts its initial value to all processors in the first round, and the ''interactive consistency Problem" designs a Protocol which can make every fault-free Processor meet the following goals [24] , [28] are limited to the case of processor failures only (the 5th assumption). In a practical situation, a communication link can also fail.
Traditionally, such a link fault was treated as a processor fault [24] . The treatment ignores the fact that the processor connected with a faulty link is still in fault-free (i.e., called in-IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING, VOL. 4, NO. 3, JUNE 1992 tB: F a u l t y processor I : F a u l t y l i n k s Fig. 1 . An unreliable fully connected network ( R = 6). nocent processor). For instance, if link La, between processors a and e failed,as shown in Fig. 1 , then processor a may receive a false message from processor e. If the link of the network is fault-free, processor a will mislead that the received false message is caused by faulty processor e. Similarly, processor e will misinterpret that processor a failed. The other processors will treat either a, e, or both a and e as faulty. Such ill-defined treatment has the following drawbacks.
If a fault-free processor is treated as faulty, then it will not be included in the process of reaching a common value; this violates the definition of the BA problem which requires that every fault-free processor agrees on a common value.
The number of faulty processors is enlarged, therefore, some fault-free processors may not be able to reach an agreement as they should. As an example, if processor b and link La, in Fig. 1 both fail, the network will have three faulty processors; namely b, a, and e. When Reischuk's protocol [24] is applied, the fault-free processors may be confused by the three faulty processors. Since the number of faulty processors is three, and it is beyond the limit of allowable faulty processors [ ( n -1)/3J = [(S -1)/3J = 1, therefore, fault-free processors c, d, and f cannot agree on a common value. If link failure is treated as it should be, the fault-free processors of a, c, d, e, and f can reach an agreement [30] .
Based on the discussion, a link failure should be treated differently from the case of a processor failure. In the following, the symptom of a faulty processor, a faulty link, and the case of faulty processorflink are discussed.
3) The Type of Processor Failure In general, a processor failure can be classified into three types. The first one is called a crash fault [13] which covers the case of a permanent halting processor. The second one is called an omission fault [11] .
Such a fault reflects the case when processor i does transmit the message to processor j but does not transmit the message to processor k as it should be in a given round. The third type is commonly called a malicious fault [l] (or Byzantine fault [ 131) . In this fault, the output of a processor is random and the processor could yield an unpredictable message at an instance. Based on the definition of a malicious fault, the crash fault, the omission fault, or other possible fault, can be treated as a special case of a malicious fault. If the BA problem with a malicious fault is solved, then other fault types can also be solved.
4 ) The Type of Link Failure Similarly, the symptoms for a faulty link can also be classified into three types. The first one is called a crash fault which reflects the case of a broken link. The second one is a stuck-at fault (SA-fault), in which the message received along a faulty link is always a constant. The third type is also called a malicious fault, and the behavior of such a fault is unpredictable. Similar to the case of a processor with a malicious fault, the symptoms of a malicious faulty link 1)
2)
cover the other possible symptoms of a faulty link. If the BA problem in a malicious fault is solved, then the problem for other fault types can also be solved. The protocol proposed by Yan and Chin [30] does solve the BA problem with malicious link failures by using only two rounds, and it can tolerate [n/2] -1 faulty links.
5) Generalized Failures In general, the processor and link can both fail. This is the case studied in this paper. In the generalized case, there are nine types of failures because a processor or a link each can have three types of failure. For ease of discussion, each fault type is denoted by a pair of symptoms. The first one in a pair represents the fault type for a processor, and the second denotes the fault type for a link. For example, an omissionsrash fault states that the processor is in the symptom of omission fault and the link is in the type of crash fault. The nine possible fault types are: crash-crash, crash-SA, crash-malicious, omission-crash, omission-SA, . omission-malicious, malicious-crash, malicious-SA, and malicious-malicious. The symptom of a malicious fault is unpredictable, and the behavior of other faults can be treated as a special case of a malicious fault, hence, the malicious-malicious case covers the other eight pairs of symptoms. Protocol designed for solving a generalized BA problem with malicious-malicious faults are referred to as an optimal protocol for the BA problem (OPBA). The word "optimal" means that the protocol should take the minimum number of required rounds to reach an agreement, and can tolerate the maximum number of faulty components. For OPBA, the minimum number of rounds is t, + 2, and the With the malicious-malicious fault type, the three agreement problems are re-examined in this paper. Since the BA protocol can be extended to solve the interactive consistency problem and the consensus problem as indicated in Section I-A, the BA problem is studied first. Section I1 describes the approach and the basic concept of OPBA. The detailed description of OPBA is given in Section 111. Subsequently, the correctness and optimality of OPBA are presented. With the result of OPBA, two protocols: optimal protocol for the interactive consistency problem (OPIC) and optimal protocol for the consensus problem (OPCP), are proposed in Section IV to solve the interactive consistency problem and the consensus problem, respectively. Section V summarizes the conclusions and discusses some unsolved problems.
In short, the goal of the BA problem is to make each fault-free processor have a common agreement on a source's initial value (or a predefined default value), therefore, each processor should have enough agreement values from all other processors if they are fault-free; hence, every faultfree processor exchanges its received value with all others. The concept is called the message exchange phase. After each processor collects the enough agreement messages, then the concept of majority vote is used to determine the final agreement value. The concept is called the decision making phase. Based on these two phases, the relevant approaches taken by OPBA are discussed next.
APPROACH AND CONCEPT
In the first round, each processor has a vote corresponding to
Since OPBA makes every fault-free processor reach an agreement through a direct message exchange among processors, the first step done by OPBA is to determine the number of rounds required. If the fault of the component (or called the unhealthy condition of the network) is known, then, OPBA can estimate the minimum number of rounds required to solve a BA problem. For instance, if the faulty component is a processor, then OPBA can save some round required to remove the influence of a faulty link; therefore, OPBA can be run efficiently. If both the processor and link are fallible in the network, the number of rounds required should be increased. By using the rounds required, each processor directly communicates with other processors and itself in order to collect enough messages of each processor. The work of exchanging all of the processors' messages constitutes the message exchange phase of OPBA. Using the messages collected on the message exchange phase, a decision of making a common value is done by each processor. This phase is called the decision making phase of OPBA. Conceptually, OPBA removes the influence of a faulty link during the message exchange phase by using a majority voting scheme because the major links of the network are assumed to be fault-free [30] and enough correct messages are collected. After the influence of a faulty link is removed, the decision making phase subsequently removes the influence of faulty processors by using the messages collected in the message exchange phase, and then a common value is computed and the agreement is done since the major processors of the network are assumed to be fault-free [3] .
In these two phases, the message exchange phase is a time consuming phase; therefore, how to reduce the number of required rounds is the major concern in the design of an optimal protocol. If the unhealthy condition of the network is given, then the number of required rounds can be minimized. For a given fully connected network, there are four ,possible unhealthy conditions: 1) all components are fault-free; 2) the fallible component is link only; 3) the fallible component is processor only; and 4) both processor and link can be faulty. How OPBA treats these four cases is stated in in the following.
Case I : All components are fault-free. In this case, each processor will eventually reach a common value which is initialized from the source in the first round of the message exchange phase. Since only one value is received in the message exchange phase, each fault-free processor agrees on such value at the end of the decision making phase. An agreement is reached at the cost of one round.
Case 2: The fallible component is a link.
In this case, each fault-free processor does not know which links are faulty, it only knows that the links of the network are fallible. In order to eliminate the influence due to a faulty link through a majority voting mechanism, a processor shall have all other processors' messages. This is done in a message exchange phase. If major links are fault-free, the final agreement value can be determined through a majority voting scheme taken at the decision making phase. In this case, OPBA only takes two rounds in the message exchange phase. the source's initial value. In the second round, each processor broadcasts its own vote to all processors, and each processor has all processors' votes about the source's initial value. Since the major links are assumed to be fault-free, the major votes among all received votes are not influenced by a faulty link. In other words, the major votes are free from the influence of a faulty link. Therefore, in the decision making phase, an agreement can be determined by using the majority vote. By observation, the key point of OPBA in this case is the majority scheme (MAJ) and described in Appendix A; the basic concept of MAJ is based on majority voting.
As for the data structure used in the case, a tree structure called the message storage tree (MS-tree) [30] is used by MAJ to remove the influence of faulty links. Basically, the MStree is constructed by the following concepts: if a processor receives a value w from processor i , then the processor stores a value named val(i) = w to a vertex named i of its MS-tree.
The details of a processor's MS-tree are given in Appendix B. This tree structure is also used in Case 4.
Case 3: The fallible component is a-processor.
In the message exchange phase, each fault-free processor broadcasts the messages received at the ith round to all processors at the beginning of the (i+l)th round. If the number of rounds reaches to t, + 1 [3], then the collected messages are enough to make each fault-free processor able to compute a common value through a majority vote taken in the decision making phase, because the major processors of the network are fault-free. If the number of rounds is less than t, + 1, then the common value cannot be found because the majority vote cannot be applied at the moment due to lack of enough voting messages. To get enough messages, t, + 1 rounds are required in this case, and then the proposed majority voting function, called VOTE and described in Appendix C, can be used to compute a common value.
The data structure used in this case is called an information collection tree (IC-tree) [3] , and maintained by each faultfree processor. An IC-tree stores the received messages and eliminates the influence of faulty processors. Basically, an ICtree is similar to the preceding MS-tree except that the name of each vertex in an IC-tree is nonrepeatable, while the name of a vertex in a MS-tree is repeatable. In other words, to lessen the influence of a faulty processor, the stored messages of an IC-tree shall be nonrepeatable. The detailed description for an IC-tree is given in Appendix D.
When the number of rounds reaches to t, + 1, the common value can be determined; hence, OPBA requires t, + 1 rounds to solve the BA problem in the case.
Case 4: Both can be faulty. In the general case, both processors and links can be subject to malicious faults; therefore, to reach an agreement, the influence caused by a faulty processor and a faulty link should both be removed. A direct way to remove such false influence is to combine the previous processor failure protocol (31, [17] and link failure protocol [30] ; however, the previous protocols are valid only for the case of a specific fallible component (processor only or link only) [ 2 ] , [7] , [20] , [30] , the environment is different from the case (both are fallible); hence the previous protocols cannot be directly used in this case, unless they are used to modify the environment to fit the previous protocols. For instance, the link failure protocol [30j is valid only for the case when the number of false messages collected by each fault-free processor does not exceed Ln/2] -1 when n messages are collected by the fault-free processor during a round; therefore, to apply a link failure protocol, the messages collected should follow such a requirement; otherwise, the link failure protocol [30] cannot be applied. The detailed description of such concept will be indicated in Figs . Based on such a message, which is free from the influence of any faulty component, an agreement is reached. From the previous discussion, it is important to note that reaching an agreement depends on the results of applying a majority voting to the messages collected by each fault-free processor; so, the parameter of characterizing the achievement of an agreement is the number of false messages, not the number of faulty components, even if the false messages are broadcast by the faulty components. On the other hand, the symptom of a faulty processor and a faulty link are both subject to malicious faults, hence, the false messages caused by a faulty processor or a faulty link could not be distinguished, then the influence of each false message on the majority voting is identical. Therefore, we do not care whether the false message is caused by a faulty processor or a faulty link when we take a majority voting on the messages collected by each fault-free processor. However, since the disruptive behavior of a faulty link is different from the disruptive behavior of a faulty processor, we need to combine two different protocols to solve the general case. A faulty link may change maliciously the messages sent to the pair of adjacent processors connected with the link, and then put such a pair of processors in disagreement. For example, as shown in Fig. 3(a) , the agreement of processors i and j is free from the influence of link La, if the link is faultfree. Conversely, if L,, fails as shown in Fig. 3(b) , then the messages exchanged between processors i and j may be influenced by La,; so that processors i and j may not agree on a common value. However, L,, cannot influence the agreement between processors i and k as shown in Fig. 3 (b) because the messages exchanged between i and Ic do not pass through La,. As for the behavior of a faulty processor, Fig. 3(c) shows an example. Since processor i failed, it may send conflict messages to different processors, so that processor j has "1" and k has "0;" the agreement of processors j and k cannot be reached. In short, a faulty processor may cause all of the processors in the network to disagree on a common value, but a faulty link can only cause a pair of processors connected with the link to disagree on a common value. Since the disruptive behavior caused by a faulty link or a faulty processor is different, we need two different protocols to resolve such false influence of different components when processors and links are both fallible in the network. However, we only consider whether the number of false messages collected by each faultfree processor exceeds the bound tolerated by the applied protocol or not, regardless of the false messages caused by a faulty processor or a faulty link, when we apply a protocol to resolve the false influence caused by a faulty component.
As for the number of faulty components to be allowed, the previous protocols [3], [17] , [30] are the special cases of the generalized BA problem and the cases handled by a general protocol should cover the cases handled by a special protocol, hence, the bound of allowable faulty components of the previous protocols can be used as the bound of the general case. Previously, t p ( l [ ( n -1)/3]) was the maximum number of faulty processors to be allowed by Lamport's protocol [17] in a processor failure case, and t e ( l Ln/2] -1) was the maximum number of faulty links to be allowed by the protocol of Yan and Chin [30] in a link failure case. Since te > tp and the number of faulty components to be allowed should be greater than the number of faulty processors to be allowed, it should be assumed that the protocol proposed in the case can tolerate ft = te faulty components of which t, are faulty processors and the rest are faulty links. Section 1II.B will prove that the number of faulty components to be allowed here is the maximum.
Based on above concepts and assumptions, there are four possible methods to remove a false influence according to the order of removing the influence of a faulty processor and a faulty link.
1) Removing the influence caused by a faulty processor and a faulty link simultaneously. 2) Removing the influence caused by a faulty processor first, and then removing the influence caused by a faulty link. 3) Removing the influence caused by a faulty link first, and then removing the influence caused by a faulty processor. 4) Removing the influence caused by a faulty link and a faulty processor alternately. Case 4.1: Suppose the approach can be done, then there exists such a protocol which can remove the influence of t, faulty processors and certain faulty links simultaneously. Since the symptom of a faulty processor and a faulty link are both assumed malicious, the false messages caused by each faulty component cannot be distinguished. If the above protocol is applied to a fully connected network with processor failure only, then the protocol should be able to remove the false influence caused by more than t, faulty processors. The conclusion is against the assertion of Lamport [17] . It is impossible to reach an agreement if there exist more than t, faulty processors in a fully connected network. Therefore, the approach of the case is inapplicable.
Case 4.2: Assume the symptom of a faulty processor and a faulty link are both malicious, hence, the false messages caused by a faulty processor or a faulty link cannot be distinguished. If the influence of a faulty processor is to be removed, the number of false messages collected by a fault-free processor may be greater than the number of false messages caused by t, faulty processors. Based on the assertion of Lamport [17] , the previous protocols [4], [7] , [13] , [18] , [25] , [26] , [28] are in valid in this environment unless a new protocol can be designed to remove the influence of a faulty processor in this case.
If such a new protocol exists, the number of rounds required by the protocol should be as follows. From the result of Fischer [12] , the number of rounds required for a protocol is at least t, + 1 if the protocol is used to remove the influence of a faulty processor. Therefore, the new protocol requires at least t, + 1 rounds to remove the influence of a faulty processor; however, such expense is used only to remove the influence of a faulty processor; and the final agreement is influenced by both faulty processors and faulty links, so the influence of a faulty link should also be removed subsequently for reaching an agreement. To reach such a goal, one or more rounds are required to collect enough messages; otherwise, the messages of other processors could not be known and the final agreement may not be reached. So far, the number of rounds executed by the new protocol is t, + 2 or more. Since we only remove the influence of a faulty processor and do not identify which particular processor failed during executing the first t, + 1 rounds, the faulty processor still influences the collected messages in the (t, + 2)th or later round. Such false influence of a faulty processor should also be removed and t, + 1 additional rounds are required; otherwise, the influence of a faulty processor in the (t, + 2)th, the later round, and the influence of a faulty link cannot be removed from each faultfree processor so that an agreement cannot be reached. In short, the total number of rounds required by the new protocol is at least t,+2+(tP+l) = 2(tp+l)+l. This number is greater than the case stated in the following, hence, the approach in this case is also inapplicable because the minimization of rounds required is the fundamental of designing an optimal agreement protocol.
Case 4.3: In this case, the influence of a faulty link is removed first by using the protocol of Yan and Chin [30] , and then the influence of a faulty processor is removed through the protocol of Bar-Noy et al. [3] . First of all, we explain why the protocol of Yan and Chin [30] can remove the influence of a faulty link when processors and links are both fallible in the network. Let us check the case if a message is under the influence of a faulty processor. When a sender fails, it may broadcast "1" to a half of the processors (including the sender itself) in the network and "0" to the others. Therefore, n / 2 -1 receivers and the sender both have "1" and the rest n / 2 receivers have "0." To reach an agreement with others, a receiver will collect the messages from all of the processors. Then, receiver a may have (n/2 -1) + 1 = ( n / 2 ) 1's and (n/2)0's and receiver b may have ( n / 2 -1)l's and ( n / 2 + l)O's due to the sender who sends "1" to a and "0" to b at the moment. Consequently, processor a is agreed on a default value and b is agreed on " 0 through the majority voting proposed by Yan and Chin [30] , and the computed value is still influenced by a faulty processor (the sender). In short, the protocol of Yan and Chin [30] cannot remove the influence of a faulty processor in the case. However, if the sender is fault-free and the link connected with a receiver fails, then the influence of such a faulty link can be removed as follows. Since the sender is fault-free, it broadcasts the same value, say "1," to all processors. However, a receiver may have received "0" from the sender if the link connected with the sender failed. However, when this receiver collects all of the processors' messages, it may have ([./a] -1)O's at most (due to [n/2J -1 faulty components in the network, including the faulty processors and the faulty links) and [n/2]l's. So, when both processors and links are fallible in the network every receiver can obtain the same majority value "1," in this case through the protocol of Yan and Chin [30] , regardless of whether or not the link connected with the sender fails or is fault-free. In other words, if the sender broadcasts a value to all processors at the rth round, then the value received by each receiver may be under the influence of a faulty processor (the sender may fail) or a faulty link (connected with the sender) as shown in Fig. 4(a) . At the starting of the next ( r + 1)th round, say t;+l, each receiver collects all of the processors' messages and the collected messages are still influenced by the faulty components in the network as shown in Fig. 4(b) . Also, then at t : +l the ending of the ( r + 1)th round, as shown in Fig. 4(c) , the protocol of [30] can be used to remove the influence of a faulty link on the messages received from the sender at the rth round, if the number of faulty components (including the faulty processors and faulty links) does not exceed Ln/2] -1.
Note that the computed value may still be influenced by a faulty processor because the protocol of [30] cannot remove the influence of a faulty processor if the sender fails as in the previous discussion.
With the convention described in Figs. 1 and 3 , the approach taken in Case 4.3 can be described in Fig. 5 from T = 1 to t, + 1. If T = 1, at t t (the ending of the first round), the messages collected by each fault-free processor are under the influence of a faulty processor and a faulty link as shown in Fig. 5(a) . Then at t; (the starting of the second round), each processor broadcasts its received messages at t t to all processors. The messages collected by each fault-free processor are also under the influence of a faulty processor and a faulty link, as depicted in Fig. 5(b) , because every component in the network is assumed fallible. As we had described in Fig.  4 , Yan and Chin's protocol [30] at the moment can be used to remove the influence of a faulty link, then the collected messages can be changed from Fig. 5(b) to Fig. 5(c) . Through the same procedures, at t:, the influence of a faulty link on the messages collected by a fault-free processor at t; can be removed and the messages shown in Fig. 5(d) become Fig.   5 (e). By iteratively, at t;,, the collected messages of a faultfree processor are shown in Fig. 5 (Q, in which the messages collected at the (t, + 1)th and the (t, + 2)th round are both under the influence of faulty processors and faulty links; but at t;,, the influence of a faulty link on the (t, + 1)th round's rnes:ages is removed by using the protocol of Yan and Chin 1301 as presented in Fig. 5 (g ) through the convention shown in Fig. 4 . By observation, the resulting messages at the first (t, + 1) rounds are all free from the influence of a faulty link; if the messages collected at the (t, + 2)th round are deleted from Fig. 5(g) , then the results, shown in Fig. 5(h) , are similar to the convention shown in Fig. 2(a) . As shown in Fig. 2 , the protocol of Bar-Noy et al. [3] can be used to remove the influence of a faulty processor and compute a common value as shown in Fig. 5(i) . The agreement is reached.
From the previous description, the approach in this case requires t, + 2 rounds to solve a generalized BA problem. Such a number t, + 2 is less than the number of rounds 2(t, + 1) + 1 required in Case 4.2. Now, let us check the best possible approach to remove the influence of a faulty processor and a faulty link alternately as follows. Case 4.4: The BA problem, by definition, does not assume that a fault-free processor awards which particular component is faulty, therefore, a fault-free processor would not be able to remove the influence caused by a specific faulty component. If we require removal of the influence due to a special faulty component, additional rounds would be required to identify the particular faulty component. However, minimizing the number of required rounds is the fundamental requirement for designing a protocol, hence, such an approach is impractical.
From the discussion, the third approach is chosen to remove the influence caused by a faulty link at first (as in Case 2), and then removes the influence caused by a faulty processor (as in Case 3); therefore, the protocol designed for Case 4 combines the concepts of Case 2 and Case 3 as follows.
In Case 4, OPBA also has two phases: the message exchange phase and the decision making phase. In the message exchange phase, OPBA takes tp + 2 rounds, and the collected messages are stored into an MS-tree for the purpose of removing the influence of faulty links following Case 2's concept. At the start of the decision making phase, to avoid a faulty processor that repeatedly influences the collected messages, each faultfree processor's MS-tree should be reorganized to an IC-tree. Based on the collected messages stored in an IC-tree, a common value can be obtained in the decision making phase by using the concept of Case 3. Therefore, an agreement is reached.
Based on the discussion, the number of rounds required by OPBA for each case, denoted 6, is as follows:
Case 1: 6 = 1, if the components in a fully connected network are all in fault-free; = t,+2, OPBA uses t,+2 rounds in the message exchange phase to make all fault-free processors reach an agreement. When the minimum number of rounds required is determined, each fault-free processor uses the number of message exchanges to collect the required messages, and then the collected messages are used to compute a common value during the decision making phase.
t, = L(n -1)/3J, X = 0, 6 = t, + X + 1 = t, + 1, OPBA
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
OF OPBA By (CBI) and (GBz), to make every fault-free processor reach a common value is the final goal. To reach such a goal in a fully connected network with n processors, each processor executes OPBA.
As described in Section 11, there are four possible unhealthy conditions for solving a generalized BA problem. If the unhealthy condition of the network is known, the minimum number of required rounds can be estimated; otherwise, t, + 2 rounds are required as a generalized case. Then, each processor executes the message exchange phase and the decision making phase as follows.
Protocol OPBA (For Each Processor) Preprocessing:
If the unhealthy condition of the network is given, then 1) If the processor is fallible, then t, is set to l(n -1)/3], else t, = 0; if the link is fallible, then X = 1, else X = 0;
2) S = t, + X + 1; (the number of required rounds); otherwise, S is set to L(n -1)/3] + 2.
Message Exchange Phase: r = 1 do: 1) The source broadcasts its initial value U, to each other and itself; and each receiver stores its received value in the root of its MS-tree.
2) If T = 6, then GOTO Decision Making Phase.
1) Each processor broadcasts the values at level T -1 to the others and itself, and stores the received values to the corresponding vertices at level T of the MS-tree.
2) Function MAJ is used to each vertex at level r -1 for each processor's MS-tree and the function value is broadcasted to others and itself.
For r = 2,. . . , Sdo:
Decision Making Phase: 1) Each processor's MS-tree is reorganized into a corresponding IC-tree.
2 ) Function VOTE is applied to root s of each processor's IC-tree so that the common value VOTE(s) is obtained; and then halts the protocol. At that time, each fault-free processor shall be agreed on a common value VOTE(s). After completing the protocol, every processor will agree on a common value VOTJZ(s).
A. Correctness
In this section, attention is focused on proving the correctness of OPBA if the total number of faulty components does not exceed Ln/21 -1. By the definition of the general case, the processor and link can both fail with malicious faults. To reach an agreement, each fault-free processor should be insulated from the influence of a faulty processor and a faulty link. As described in Section 11, OPBA first removes the influence of a faulty link, and then removes the influence of a faulty processor. If the influence of a faulty link is removed by using the messages collected in the message exchange phase, then the resulting messages are only possibly influenced by a faulty processor. If the influence of a faulty processor is also removed in the decision making phase, then the messages collected by each fault-free processor are free from the influence of a faulty component, and an agreement is reached. This is the basic concept of proving the correctness of OPBA.
Since OPBA combines the previous protocols as presented in Section 11, some terminologies used by these protocols [3] , [17] are used here.
A BA protocol is to make each fault-free processor have a common value. To prove the correctness of OPBA, a vertex a is called common [3] if each fault-free processor computes a same value for a. In other words, if vertex cy is common, then the value stored in vertex cy of each fault-free processor's MStree or IC-tree is identical. When each fault-free processor has a common initial value of the source in the root of an IC-tree, if root s of an IC-tree in a fault-free processor is common, the initial value received from the source is stored in the root of the tree structure; therefore, an agreement is reached since the root is common. To ease discussion, the definition of an agreement can be rewritten as: 1) (GBI'): root s is common; 2) (GB2'): VOTE(s)= U, for each fault-free processor, if the source is fault-free. Note that (GB2') = (GB2) where VOTE(s) is the computed common value for root s.
, To prove that a vertex is common, the term common frontier [3] is defined as follows. If every root-to-leaf path of the tree (an MS-tree or an IC-tree) contains a common vertex, then the collection of the common vertices forms a common frontier. In other words, every fault-free processor has the same messages collected in the common frontier if a common frontier does exist in a fault-free processor's tree structure (MS-tree or ICtree); subsequently, by using the same majority voting function to compute the root value of the tree structure, every fault-free processor can compute the same root value because the same input (the same collected messages in the common frontier) and the same computing function will cause the same output (the root value).
This concept is very similar to the concept of Bar-Noy et al. [3] for the processor failure case. Since the processors and the links are both assumed fallible in the general case, the influence of a faulty link should be removed and then the above concepts can be used to prove the correctness of OPBA.
To prove the correctness that the influence of a faulty link is removed by OPBA, the following two terms are defined: 1) Correct vertex: Vertex ai of a tree is a correct vertex if processor i (the last processor name in vertex ai's processor name list) is fault-free. In other words, a correct vertex is a place to store the value received from a fault-free processor. Note that each processor does not know which component is fault-free and which vertex in its tree structure is correct; however, each fault-free processor does know that there exists some correct vertices in its tree structure because some processors in the network are fault-free.
2) True value: For a vertex ai in a tree structure of a faultfree processor j , val(ai) is the true value of vertex ai if link L,j is fault-free. In other words, the stored value is called the true value of a vertex if the value stored in such a vertex is free from the influence of a faulty link.
If the true value of each correct vertex in an MS-tree can be obtained, then the values stored on the correct vertices in an MS-tree are free from the influence of a faulty link. Based on the messages stored in an MS-tree, the concept of the Bar-Noy et al. protocol [3] can be used to prove the correctness of OPBA as described earlier. By the definition of a correct vertex, its stored value is received from a faultfree processor, and a fault-free processor always broadcasts the same value to all processors; therefore, the correct vertices of such a MS-tree are common. Through the reorganization rules, a MS-tree becomes an IC-tree and the values stored on the correct vertices are still the same; therefore, all correct vertices of an IC-tree are also common. By the definition of the correct vertex, a common frontier does exist in the IC-tree. Thus the root can be proved as a common vertex [(GBl') is true] due to the existence of a common frontier, regardless of the correctness of a source. An agreement of the root value is reached. To check the validity of (GBz'), (GB2') is always true due to the propositional logic [5] if the source is failed. Conversely, root s is a correct vertex by the definition of a correct vertex if the source is fault-free. If all correct vertices' true value can be computed by OPBA, then the true value of the root can be computed because the root is a correct vertex. By definition, the true value of the root is the initial val}ue of the source, if the source is fault-free. In short, each fault-free processor's root value is the initial value of the source if the source is fault-free; therefore, (GB2') is true when the source is fault-free. Since (GB1') and (GB2') are both true regardless of the correctness of source, the BA problem is solved.
The correctness of OPBA depends on the assertion that the true value of each correct vertex in a MS-tree can be obtained by OPBA. The following explains this fact.
As stated in Section 11, the true value of a correct vertex a in a MS-tree is obtained by applying function MAJ(a) to the vertex a. Since the message val(ai) is sent by a fault-free processor i for 1 5 i 5 n to all processors, vertex ai's true value should be obtained by applying MAJ to vertex ai in each fault-free processor's MS-tree through execution OPBA. Lemma 1 indicates that the true value of all correct vertices in an MS-tree can be obtained by OPBA. In other words, the influence of a faulty link is removed from each faultfree processor's MS-tree by OPBA. Lemma 2 proves that all correct vertices in each fault-free processor's MS-tree, except the leaves, are common. After eliminating the leaves of an MS-tree, Lemmas 3 and 4 state that all correct vertices in an IC-tree are still common if the IC-tree is constructed from an MS-tree by using the reorganization rules. By the definition of a common frontier, Lemma 5 shows the existence of a common frontier in an IC-tree. Then, by induction, Lemma 6 and Corollary 2 present a fact that the root of a tree is common if the common frontier does exist in an IC-tree. Therefore, the computed value stored at the root is a common value and free from the influence of a faulty processor. By using these lemmas and corollaries, the influences of a faulty link and a faulty processor are both removed, hence, Theorems 1 and 2 prove the correctness of OPBA. As for the minimum number of rounds required and the maximum number of faulty components to be allowed by OPBA, these are depicted in the next section.
Since the processor failure and link failure are the special case, only the correctness of a general case is proved here, and then the correctness of the special case follows.
Lemma I : At the ( r -1)th round, a fault-free processor i broadcasts Val( a ) to all processors, and a fault-free processor j stores val(ai) in vertex a i of its MS-tree. At the rth round, MAJ(ai) = val(a) is applied to the vertex in the (r-1)th level of each fault-free processor j's MS-tree, for 1 5 j 5 n, if less than Ln/2J -1 faulty components are in a fully connected network; for each T in 2 5 r 5 t, + 2.
Proof: Part 1. Link Lij is fault-free. Since link Lij is fault-free, processor j will receive val(ai) from processor i in the round T -1, and val(ai) = val(a). Meanwhile, the value val(a) of processor i will be broadcasted to the others. There are ( n -1) links connected with a processor in which at most [n/2] -1 are faulty links in the system. In the next round, processor j receives at least Lemma 2: All correct and nonleaf vertices in a fault-free processor's MS-tree are common.
Proof:
The value stored in a correct vertex j is w which implies that the value stored in vertex of processor j's MS-tree is v . Since processor j is correct, the value val(aj) = w should be stored in every fault-free processor's MS-tree, unless the link connected by processor j is faulty. In the case, at least [n/21 stored values in the children of vertex j for the receiver are common value v . Thus by applying MAJ on the vertex a j , the majority value v can be obtained and restored in vertex aj.
Hence, if all correct vertices have common stored value w, Lemma 3: If a parent (predecessor) is correct in a MS-tree, then the correct children (successor) of the parent should also be common; hence, the true value for these correct children is the same at level t, + 1. Since the level of cyk is r -1 5 t, + 1, regardless of whether or not the link is faultfree or faulty, the true value of correct children a k (at the level 5 t, + 1, k is a fault-free processor) should be the true value of its correct parent a; such that the children are common.

W
Proof: By reorganization rules, the IC-tree is without repetition. At level t, or above, the correct vertex cy has at least 2t, + 1 children ( n -t, 5 2t, + 1); in which at least t, + 1 are correct. By Lemma 3, if the true value of those t, + 1 correct vertices is common, then the majority value of vertex is a common. Thus the correct vertex Q: is common in the IC-tree, if the level of a is less than and equal to t,.
At the level t, + 1, by Lemma 3, the correct vertex is still common. Thus all correct vertices of the IC-tree are common..
Lemma 5: The common frontier does exist in an IC-tree.
Proof:
In the IC-tree, there are t, + 1 vertices along each root-to-leaf path. Since there are at most t, faulty processors in the network, there are at least one correct vertex along each root-to-leaf path. By Lemma 4, there are at least one common vertex in every path, thus the common frontier exists in the MAJ(az), in the set is val(a).
then they are common.
W
Lemma 4: All correct vertices of an IC-tree are common.
IC-tree. Lemma 6: Let a be a vertex, if there is a common frontier in the subtree rooted at a , then a is common.
Proof: By induction on the height of a.
In the case of a's height is 0, and the common frontier (a itself) exists, then a is common. In the case of a's height is q. Since the height of cy's children is 11 -1, by induction hypothesis, all a's children are common. Therefore, a is also common.
Corollary 2: If the common frontier exists in a tree, then the root of the tree is common.
Theorem I: The root of a fault-free processor's IC-tree is common.
Proof: From Lemma 5 and Corollary 2, the theorem is proved.
Theorem 2: Protocol OPBA does solve the generalized BA problem.
Proof: (GB1') the root is common. By Theorem 1, (GB1') is satisfied. (GB2') VOTE(s) = v, for all fault-free processors, if the source is fault-free.
Since the source is fault-free, then it broadcasts a common value (its initial value w,) to all processors. Based on such a common initial message, all fault-free processors execute message exchange. Therefore, the true value of correct vertices for all fault-free processors' MS-tree is U,. When the MS-tree is reorganized to be the IC-tree, common messages all remain (because the reorganization rules just delete certain vertices and no values are revised). Thus each correct vertex of the IC-tree is common (Lemma 4), and the true value is U,. Since the source is fault-free, by Lemma 4, the root of the IC-tree is also a correct vertex. By Theorem 1, this root is common. The computed value VOTE(s) = w, in the root for all fault-free processors. Thus, (GB2') is also satisfied.
B. Complexity
The complexity of OPBA is defined in terms of 1) the number of rounds required and 2) the number of faulty components allowed. We declare that OPBA is optimal in the sense that it requires the minimum number of rounds and can tolerate a maximum number of faulty components.
Theorem 3 proves that OPBA can solve the generalized BA problem by using t, + 2 rounds if the number of allowable faulty components is not greater than Ln/2J -1 of which the number of allowable faulty processors is less than or equal to
As stated in Section I-B, the BA problem for the processor failures only [12] or the link failures only [30] can be treated as a special case of the generalized BA problem; therefore, Theorem 4 shows that OPBA can solve the generalized BA problem within the minimum number of rounds, and Theorem 5 illustrates that OPBA can tolerate the maximum number of allowable faulty components. 
which is a contradiction. w resolved. Hence ,the theorem is proved.
IV. EXTENSION OF OPBA
By the definition of the interactive consistency problem and the consensus problem, each fault-free processor has its own initial value. If processor a is treated as source a, processor b is treated as source b, . . ., etc., and then to solve an interactive consistency problem or a consensus problem can be treated as to solve n BA problems simultaneously, and each processor acts as a source of a BA problem. If the set of n common agreements are reached, then the interactive consistency or the consensus can also be reached.
With n processors (sources) in a network, each faultfree processor has n MS-trees, and each MS-tree stores the messages collected from a processor during executing the message exchange phase. After removing the influence of a faulty link, a MS-tree becomes an IC-tree which is used to remove the influence of a faulty processor. When the n common values (i.e.,-so-called a common vector) are obtained by applying VOTE to each IC-tree, and then the interactive consistency is reached when each fault-free processor agrees on such a common vector. As for the consensus, the agreement can also be reached when each fault-free processor agrees on the majority of the values taken from the common vector.
A. Interactive Consistency Problem's Protocol OPIC
Basically, OPIC has two phases: the message exchange phase and the decision making phase. As OPBA, OPIC also estimates the number of required rounds before executing the message exchange phase, if the unhealthy condition of the network is known. To reach an agreement, each processor first executes the message exchange phase by broadcasting its own initial to all processors and constructs n MS-trees in order to eliminate the influence of a faulty link. In the decision making phase, each MS-tree is reorganized into an IC-tree, and a common value can be reached by applying VOTE to each IC-tree as OPBA did. Since n ICtrees correspond to n common values, a common vector V = [VOTE(l). . . . , VOTE(i), . . . , VOTE(n)] is obtained for 1 5 i 5 n; in which i corresponds to the ith processor in the network. OPIC is very similar to OPBA except that each processor has its own initial value and the agreement is a common vector V, not a common value U in OPBA.
B. Consensus Problem's Protocol OPCP
The assumption of the consensus problem is similar to the assumption of the interactive consistency problem as described in Section 1-A. The only difference is that the agreement of an interactive consistency problem is a common vector and the agreement of a consensus problem is a common value. If the common vector of an interactive consistency problem is reached, then the common value of a consensus problem is also reached by taking the majority value from the values in the common vector. Therefore, the protocol of reaching consensus can directly use the procedures of reaching an interactive consistency following with an additional step of computing the majority value from the values in the common vector. Since the common vector can be reached by OPIC, a common value is obtained by OPCP.
From the observation, OPIC and OPCP are both designed on the base of OPBA with a little modification, we can conclude that protocol OPBA can be extended to the case of the consensus problem and the interactive consistency problem. All of these three protocols estimate the number of required rounds at the beginning of executing the protocols. Based on the number of required rounds, each processor collects enough agreement values to remove the influence of faulty links in the message exchange phase, and then a majority voting concept is used to remove the influence of faulty processors and to compute a common agreement in the decision making phase. On the other hand, the differences among the protocols are listed in Table 11 . With the arguments of Sections 111-A and 111-B, the correctness and the complexity for OPIC or OPCP is a trivial exercise and is thus omitted here.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Three protocols: OPBA, OPIC, and OPCP are designed for solving the BA problem, the interactive consistency problem, and the consensus problem, respectively. Since OPBA is the foundation of the other two, Yan and Chin [30] influenced by the faulty links, an additional round is required to resolve the influence caused by the faulty links which possibly occurred at the (tP + 1)th round, hence t, + 2 rounds are required by OPBA to solve the generalized BA problem. Such t, + 2 rounds can be treated as t, + 1 + X rounds, where 1) X = 1 if the links fail; otherwise X = 0, and 2) t, is set to L(n -1)/3] if the processors fail; otherwise t, = 0. Therefore: 1) X = 0 and t, = 0: only one round is required for the source broadcasting its initial value to all processors, when all components of the network are fault-free;
2) X = 1 and t, = 0: the two rounds required are equal to that of a previous special protocol [30] when the processor is always fault-free but the link is fallible;
3) X = 0 and t, # From the preceding observation, we have the following results.
1) For solving the generalized BA problem, OPBA is optimal in terms of the number of rounds required and the number of allowable faulty components. 2) Since OPBA is designed to solve the generalized BA problem, the processor failure only or the link failure only are the special case of OPBA.
3) The symptom of the faulty components considered by OPBA is the malicious-malicious type which is the most generalized fault assumption; hence, other possible fault types can also be solved by OPBA. The conclusions are also valid for OPIC and OPCP. As for the capability of fault detection, OPBA (OPIC and OPCP) can be extended to detect which component faisl if information such as fault status of the neighbors of a processor is included during exchanging of the messages [30] . This additional information would enable OPBA (OPIC and OPCP) to solve the early stopping problem [27] as well as the other problems such as deadlock detection and diagnostic test [21] , in which an early stopping protocol requires each fault-free processor to stop executing the protocol as soon as possible if the number of faulty processors detected by each fault-free processor is less than L(n -1)/3].
Although a fully connected network is the underlying networking structure, OPBA, OPIC, and OPCP can be extended to other network models such as the regular network [15] since a fully connected network is a special case of the regular network. However, in an unknown network [5] , when neither a source nor a receiver knows the topology of the network, n is also unknown, hence, the number of required rounds cannot be estimated before starting the protocol. This contradicts the requirement of executing OPBA, OPIC, and OPCP. So, the proposed protocols cannot be extended in an unknown network.
As for the strategy used in this paper, each step of executing OPBA, OPIC, and OPCP is predetermined, such as the agreement value predefined by the source and a default value is chosen as a majority value which does not exist, during executing the whole protocol; therefore, the strategy of OPBA is called a deterministic strategy [4] . Conversely, if certain steps of a protocol cannot be determined such as when the majority value does not exist as it should be, a random number is chosen in this situation; hence, the strategy is called a randomized strategy [4] . Since OPBA requires enough correct messages to remove the influence of faulty processors and fault links, it contradicts the definition of randomized strategy because the random number may not be a correct message; therefore, OPBA cannot be extended to solve a randomized BA problem. However, the concept of removing the influence of faulty links first in OPBA is still valid for the randomized approach because the disruptive action of a faulty processor and a faulty link are both malicious whether the strategy is deterministic or randomized.
MPENDIX A. MAJ (a)
The data reduction function MAJ(a) is defined as follows.
MAJ(a)= majority value in the set of val(aj)[l 5 j 5 n } , if it exists; otherwise the complement of val(a), denoted as lval(a), is chosen. Note that a or a j is a vertex name in a MS-tree, and val(a) or val(ai) is a binary value.
In an n-processor fully connected network, there are total of n(n -1)/2 links; with only n -1 links directly connected to a specific processor. If the number of allowable faulty links does not exceed Ln/2] -1, the number of fault-free links outnumbers the faulty links for each fault-free processor; hence, the majority value is free from the influence of a faulty link. Fig. 6 (b) shows a MS-tree for the network model shown in Fig. 6 (a) . Each fault-free processor maintains such an MS-tree during the execution of OPBA. In the first round, source (processor b) broadcasts its initial value to others and itself. Since we assumed that the message's sender is always identifiable, each processor can know if the initial value of source is received. When a fault-free processor receives the message sent from the source, it stores the received value, denoted as val(s), at the root of its MS-tree as shown in Fig. 6  (b) . In the second round, each processor broadcasts the root's value of its MS-tree to all processors. If processor b sends a message val(s) to processor a, then processor a stores the message, which is denoted as val(sa), in vertex sa of its MS-tree as depicted in Fig. 6 (b) . Similarly, if processor b sends a message val(sa) to processor a, then the message is named val(sab) and stored in vertex sub of processor U'S MStree in the third round as presented in Fig. 6 (b) . Generally, message val(sa . . . IC), stored in the vertex s a . . . IC of a MStree implies that the message just received was sent through processors s, a , . . . , IC, and processor IC is the last processor to pass the message. When a message is transmitted through a processor more than once, the name of the processor will also be repeated correspondingly. For instance, message val(saa), stored in vertex sua of Fig. 6 (b) , indicates that the message is sent from s to processor a, then to processor a again; therefore, the processor name a appears twice in vertex name sua.
B. The MS-Tree
In summary, the root of a MS-tree is always named s to denote that the stored message is sent from the source in the first round; and the vertex of a MS-tree is labeled by a list of processor names. The processor name list includes the processors through which the stored message was transferred.
C. VOTE (a)
To resolve the influence caused by a faulty processor in the network and to compute a common value for reaching the agreement, a VOTE(a) function for vertex is defined below.
VOTE(a)= val(a), if a is a leaf; and the majority value in the set of {VOTE(aj)ll 5 j 5 n and vertex a j is a child of vertex a } , if such a majority value exists; otherwise a default value 4 is chosen.
val(a) is a binary value stored in vertex a.
D. The IC-Tree
An IC-tree is created from a corresponding MS-tree by the following reorganization rules. 1) The leaves at level t, + 2 of the MS-tree are deleted, since the influence due to a faulty link in the leaves of a MStree has not been removed and the majority function VOTE is only applied to remove the influence of a faulty processor.
2) The vertices with repeated processors names are deleted, to avoid a faulty processor influencing the storage messages repeatedly in an IC-tree to make a simple majority function able to compute a common value. Fig. 7 shows an example of the IC-tree reorganized from the MS-tree indicated in Fig. 6  (b) . Note that the leaves and vertex sb (s = b in this example) of the MS-tree are deleted.
Two useful properties of an IC-tree are: 1) no processor name is repeated in each vertex to avoid that a faulty processor influences the collected message repeatedly to reach an level 1 level 2 (root) Fig. 7 . The IC-tree created from the MS-tree shown in Fig. 6 (b) . agreement; and 2 ) there are t, + 1 levels in each fault-free processor's IC-tree because the ( t p + 2)th level of the MS-tree is deleted by the reorganization rules. These properties were used to prove the correctness of OPBA in Section 111-A.
